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Political and legal debates over assault rifles, large-capacity
magazines, and other lethal technology are characterized by increasing
rancor and hostility. Lack of a common vocabulary to describe the
topics of debate, much less facilitate a constructive dialogue, only
aggravates this trend. For example, gun rights advocates often disparage
the term “assault rifle” as reflecting a practical illiteracy about firearms
or treat it as some kind of “hoplophobic” smear.1 Regulators sometimes
†
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1 Stephen P. Halbrook, Banning America’s Rifle: An Assault on the Second
Amendment?, 22 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 152, 152 (2021) (“The term ‘assault weapon,’
while usually applied to some kind of rifle, is actually a pejorative term without a
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class weapons based on features that gun-rights advocates say are purely
cosmetic, leading to charges that these regulations are grotesquely overor under-inclusive.2
The doctrine defining constitutionally protected arms is advancing
without a clear sense of the object of Second Amendment protections.
District of Columbia v. Heller — the first Supreme Court case to hold
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
firearms for personal purposes like self-defense — uses various
terminology for arms in its opinion. At its most general, the Court states
that the constitution protects weapons in “common use” for “lawful
purposes,” as distinct from “arms” that are “dangerous and unusual.”3
But it doesn’t take long for those broad categories to become muddled.
Heller says that handguns capable of concealment are protected, but that
short-barreled shotguns (which are modified specifically to be carried
in one hand and concealed) are “dangerous and unusual” weapons that
may be prohibited.4 It suggests that “M-16s and the like” may be
banned; but also that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to
all instruments that constitute bearable arms” — which would include
not only M-16s, but “weapons useful in warfare” such as rocket
launchers, hand grenades, and more exotic and deadly weaponry.5 Some
lower court judges, those who eschew conventional tailoring and are
receptive to a “text-history-and-tradition-only” approach to Second
Amendment questions, have begun to suggest that weapons that are
“lineal descendants” of Founding Era arms are protected by the Second

definite meaning.”). Gun violence prevention advocates respond that the term is an
accurate reflection of gun manufacturers’ own marketing materials, which emphasized
“the military pedigree of its products.” VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., THE MILITARIZED MARKETING
OF BUSHMASTER ASSAULT RIFLES 5 (2018), https://vpc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Bushmaster2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8N8-G6E5]. “Hoplophobia” is a neologism that
roughly translates to “fear of weapons.” For more on the idea of anti-gun animus, see
Jacob D. Charles, Second Amendment Animus, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14-32 (2021).
2 See Erica Goode, Even Defining ‘Assault Rifles’ Is Complicated, N.Y. T IMES (Jan.
16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/us/even-defining-assault-weapons-iscomplicated.html [https://perma.cc/A3M8-GDEW]; see also Allen Rostron, Style,
Substance, and the Right to Keep and Bear Assault Weapons, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 301, 303
(2018) (“Critics of assault weapon bans complain that these laws irrationally draw
distinctions among firearms based on cosmetic features . . . .”). But see E. Gregory
Wallace, “Assault Weapon” Lethality, 88 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14 & n.64 (2020) (arguing for
functionality of certain features).
3 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). Elsewhere, the Court
uses the phrase “dangerous or unusual.” Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
4 Id.
5 See id. at 624.
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Amendment,6 despite the fact that such familial metaphors more often
obscure than illuminate historical relationships between technologies
of different periods.7
Sorely missing from the current debate is a shared vocabulary for
what the public policy and the constitutional doctrine is aiming to
achieve. Terms like “common use,” “dangerous and unusual,” “lineal
descendants” or “employed in civilized warfare”8 cannot adequately
discipline doctrine or debate without some common denominator for
the task. This Article suggests that focusing on lethality is one way to
converge on a shared metric for the discussion.9
The late Trevor N. Dupuy, a senior U.S. Army officer during World
War II who later became a respected and prolific military historian,
developed one such metric in the middle of the twentieth century —
the Theoretical Lethality Index (“TLI”). In 1964, the United States
Army contracted with Dupuy to analyze how the killing power of
weapons had increased over time — he created the TLI to measure how
many people a particular weapon could kill in one hour.10 Dupuy
6 See, e.g., Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 974 F.3d 237,
257 (3d Cir. 2020) (Matey, J., dissenting) (stating that “I believe the proper interpretive
approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition” and citing the “lineal
descendant” language from Heller oral argument (internal quotation marks omitted and
citations omitted)); Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“The modern handgun — and for that matter the rifle and long-barreled shotgun — is
undoubtedly quite improved over its colonial-era predecessor, but it is, after all, a lineal
descendant of that founding-era weapon . . . .”).
7 See Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 363 (2019) (“Is the modern AR-15 a
‘lineal descendant’ of the colonial-era musket? Guns have no progeny, so one cannot
trace their lineage directly through some kind of family tree.”); see also Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1478 (2009) (describing this analytical
technique as “largely indeterminate”).
8 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840).
9 See Jennifer Tucker, Now That Guns Can Kill Hundreds in Minutes, Supreme Court
Should Rethink the Rights Question, CNN (Oct. 20, 2021, 7:31 AM EDT)
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/opinions/supreme-court-gun-rights-case-lethalitytucker/index.html [https://perma.cc/8JMV-XR48]. We are not the first to identify
lethality as a potential metric. See Wallace, supra note 2, at 17. We have a number of
disagreements with Professor Wallace’s assessment of lethality in his piece, as well his
estimation of comparative lethality. For purposes of this Article, however, we differ in
particular with his belief that lethality of a technology cannot be reduced to a single
number — the TLI is proof of concept that it can — and his skepticism of the utility of
such a metric within and between time periods.
10 HIST. EVALUATION & RSCH. ORG., FINAL REPORT ON HISTORICAL TRENDS RELATED TO
WEAPON LETHALITY (1964), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0458760.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K48C-FKDD]; see also TREVOR N. DUPUY, THE EVOLUTION OF WEAPONS AND WARFARE 92
(1980) [hereinafter EVOLUTION] (reprinting Theoretical Lethality Index table).
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worked on this project for a non-partisan entity which had an interest
in the accuracy and utility of his formula — the United States military.
As such, Dupuy’s Theoretical Lethality Index offers a useful metric for
quantifying the lethality of firearms in historical terms. His index can
provide at least a starting point to construct a common scale to assess
the functionality of weapons both within and across various time
periods.
Part I of this Article outlines the state of Second Amendment doctrine
with respect to which and what type of arms are protected, and the
confused language and goals of that doctrine. Part II provides a short
biography of Dupuy and his development of the TLI. Part III
demonstrates how Dupuy’s TLI can help guide policy makers and
judges as they engage with the right to keep and bear arms in a postHeller world.
I.

LACK OF A COMMON METRIC FOR ARMS

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that individuals have a right to keep arms in their home for lawful
purposes such as self-defense, without regard to participation in any
organized military unit such as the National Guard.11 Key to that case
was how to define the word “arms” in the Second Amendment.12 It is
indisputable that a strict dictionary-definition of the word “arms” in
1791 is radically over-inclusive. Justice Antonin Scalia states in Heller
that “[t]he 18th-century meaning [of arms] is no different from the
meaning today” and that “arms” simply means “weapons.”13 Indeed, he
continues, it “borders on the frivolous” to suggest that only those arms
that existed in 1791 are protected now: “[t]he Second Amendment
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”14 But
no one really believes that. Not even Justice Scalia believes that.
There are numerous modern weapons that “constitute bearable arms”
that are categorically outside the Second Amendment’s coverage — no
matter what “bearable arms” literally means. Let’s start with bearable
arms of catastrophic lethality — vials of weaponized smallpox or VX
nerve agent, for example. These are indubitably weapons; they also are
11

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
The Second Amendment states in full: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
13 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
14 Id. at 582.
12
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capable of being carried, but no one treats these weapons of mass
destruction as raising any prima facie Second Amendment question.15
Moving down the spectrum of lethality, Heller itself categorically
excludes from Second Amendment coverage machine guns, “M–16
rifles and the like,” and short-barreled shotguns, notwithstanding
Justice Scalia’s assertion that the Second Amendment extends prima
facie to these types of weapons.16 Lower courts have followed suit,
excepting weapons like hand grenades from Second Amendment
coverage, despite their falling within a literal class of “bearable arms.”17
Instead of a radically over-inclusive textual definition of “weapons,”
Justice Scalia concedes the Second Amendment really doesn’t protect all
“bearable arms,” but only those arms in “common use,” and in
particular, those weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.”18 Handguns, according to the majority, are a
popular form of self-defense technology, commonly owned by
individuals for self-defense, and therefore are protected by the Second
Amendment. But this common use test sets up a vicious circularity, one
that Justice Stephen Breyer in his Heller dissent exposed. Heller’s
common use test means that “if tomorrow someone invents a
particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress . . .
had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress
will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so.”19 It can’t
be, according to Justice Breyer, that the only permissible regulations are
those regulations that currently exist.20
For a decade now, lower courts and scholars have struggled to break
out of this circularity. Some try to identify a reference group from which
to assess “common use.”21 At its most crude, this can reduce to
comparing the inventory of a certain weapon to that of another

15 See Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 797 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (Gould, J., concurring
in part) (“[T]o me it is obvious that the Second Amendment does not protect the right
to keep a nuclear weapon in one’s basement, or a chemical or biological weapons in
one’s attic, or a tank in one’s backyard.”), reh’g en banc, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
16 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 572.
17 See Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that hand
grenades and machine guns are unprotected “dangerous and unusual weapons for the
purposes of the Second Amendment”).
18 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).
19 Id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20 Id.
21 For a discussion of this effort, see Cody J. Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A
Proposal for Second Amendment “Type of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 231, 27883 (2015).
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commercial product — like a pickup truck.22 The presumption here is
that a weapon as widely possessed as this other product must be in
“common use.”23 Other, more sophisticated approaches attempt to
identify a more relevant reference set. For example, scholars such as
Michael O’Shea and Nelson Lund have suggested the measure for
common use should be the weapons possessed by ordinary law
enforcement.24 Others have argued that civilians should be capable of
owning even more firepower than the police.25 Still others believe the
reference group for common use should be some kind of military body,
such as the National Guard, or at the most extreme, the standing army.26
A recent development in Second Amendment doctrine is to analogize
modern weapons to historical ones. This move first appeared in the
District of Columbia Circuit Court opinion that eventually became
Heller. In that case, Parker v. District of Columbia, the court suggested
that “[t]he modern handgun — and for that matter the rifle and longbarreled shotgun — is undoubtedly quite improved over its colonial-era
predecessor, but it is, after all, a lineal descendant of that founding-era
22 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e note that in 2012, the
number of AR- and AK-style weapons manufactured and imported into the United
States was more than double the number of Ford F–150 trucks sold, the most commonly
sold vehicle in the United States.”), reh’g en banc, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
23 Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion
Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1293 (2009) (“A gun might be common because it is widely owned
. . . .”).
24 Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v.
Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 392 (2009); see also Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund,
Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1411 (2009) (arguing for a
rebuttable presumption “that civilians have a right to use weapons commonly used by
the police”).
25 Brief of Pink Pistols in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants at 16, Fyock v. City of
Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-15408)) (“If police need standardissue magazines holding 15 to 17 rounds, a fortiori law-abiding citizens need the same
firepower, if not more.”).
26 Andrew P. Napolitano, The Right to Shoot Tyrants, Not Deer, W ASH. T IMES
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/10/the-right-toshoot-tyrants-not-deer [https://perma.cc/WW48-S9WP] (“[The Second Amendment]
protects the right to shoot tyrants, and it protects the right to shoot at them effectively,
with the same instruments they would use upon us.”). Part of the reason for this
confusion is Heller’s unwillingness to expressly overrule United States v. Miller. In
Miller, the Court held that short-barreled shotguns were not Second Amendment
weapons because they were not suitable for military use. United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178 (1939). However, in Heller the Court held that military application of a
weapon was not required, and indeed, if a weapon was suitable only for military use
that’s a reason why it is not protected. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589,
624-25 (2008).
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weapon.”27 Chief Justice John Roberts echoed this “lineal descendant”
line during Heller oral argument when he speculated: “[W]e are talking
about lineal descendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal
descendants of the restrictions as well.”28 Some lower courts and
advocates have picked up on this strain of reasoning. Occasionally, this
search for “lineal descendants” of modern weapons can become arcane.
For example, in 1718, an Englishman named James Puckle patented a
multi-round “Puckle gun.” The weapon was never widely produced and
contemporaries ridiculed it for its impracticality.29 Nevertheless, some
argue that today’s 100 round magazines must be constitutionally
protected, because someone patented this curio in England in the
eighteenth century.30
None of these attempts to break out of Heller’s definitional morass is
satisfactory, and that’s partially because these tests tend to focus on
epiphenomenal rather than functional factors. Searching for answers in
analogs from automotive sales or eighteenth-century patent
applications fails to consider what rule of relevance makes the analogy
analytically sound.31 What makes weapons relevantly similar is their
lethality.32 Comparing the sales of AR-15s to pickup trucks or asking
what features of an AR-15 resemble those of a Founding era flintlock is
far less useful for assessing utility or dangerousness than focusing on
how lethal an AR-15 is compared to some other kind of weapon.
Lethality may not resolve all the definitional problems of what an “arm”

27

Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
29 David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Scott G. Hattrup, A Tale of Three Cities: The
Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177, 1195 (1995). Other
arcana common in briefing has to do with a multi round weapon taken by Meriwether
Lewis and William Clark on the Corps of Discovery. See Halbrook, supra note 1, at 165.
30 Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Semi-automatic and
multi-shot firearms were not novel or unforeseen inventions to the Founders, as the
first firearm that could fire more than ten rounds without reloading was invented
around 1580. Rapid fire guns, like the famous Puckle Gun, were patented as early as
1718 in London.”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021),
reh’g en banc sub nom. Duncan v. Bonta, No. 19-55376, 2021 WL 5577267 (9th Cir.
Nov. 30, 2021).
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning 10 (Harvard Pub. L., Working Paper
No. 21-39, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3938546 [https://perma.cc/C9V8-FYHY]
(“For analogical reasoning to operate properly, we have to know that cases A and B are
‘relevantly’ similar, and that there are not ‘relevant’ differences between them.”).
32 DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 286.
28
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is under the Second Amendment,33 but it has the advantage of being
relevant, functional, and unitary.34
II.

TREVOR DUPUY AND THE THEORETICAL LETHALITY INDEX
A. Brief Biography of Dupuy

In the middle of the twentieth century, a retired colonel named
Trevor Nevitt Dupuy developed a metric to measure a weapon’s
lethality. Dupuy was one of the most respected and prolific American
military thinkers of the last century.35 Combat during World War II
gave him a practical bent, which, combined with his analytical approach
to military history provided a new outlook on the study of weapons and
warfare. He developed sophisticated combat models that drew on his
extensive archival research as well as his personal experience as a World
War II commander.36 His derivation of a theory of combat and

33 A more rational test for a protected weapon would be not whether the weapon is
in “common use” but whether the weapon is “unreasonably dangerous” — that is,
whether its utility for something like self-defense is outweighed by its risks on other
margins. The notion of “dangerous and unusual” seems to contemplate such a costbenefit analysis. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A. H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and
Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 297 (2016).
34 In this sense, our argument takes issue with a lower court judge who has
suggested that “[n]othing in the Second Amendment makes lethality a factor to consider
because a gun’s lethality, or dangerousness, is assumed.” Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F.
Supp. 3d 1131, 1145-46 (S.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc sub nom.
Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Duncan
v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021). This is patently false, as the increased lethality
of any arm (such as a hand grenade or landmine) is certainly relevant to whether it may
be prohibited.
35 Robert Mcg. Thomas, Jr., Trevor N. Dupuy, 79, Prolific Military Historian, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1995, at B11, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/obituaries/trevor-ndupuy-79-prolific-military-historian.html [https://perma.cc/DAE6-93J9]; Jack Walker,
Trevor N. Dupuy Dead at 79, PHALANX, Sept. 1995, at 33; Susan Rich, Trevor N. Dupuy,
DUPUY INST., http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndupuy.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/YNF7-R4N5]. On Dupuy’s contributions to military history, see
CHRISTOPHER A. LAWRENCE, WAR BY NUMBERS: UNDERSTANDING CONVENTIONAL COMBAT,
at ix-17 (2017).
36 See Rich, supra note 35; Thomas, supra note 35, at B11. Dupuy regarded his chief
contribution as integrating military theory with historical experience. See LAWRENCE,
supra note 35, at ix-xii. See generally T.N. DUPUY, NUMBERS, PREDICTIONS AND WAR: USING
HISTORY TO EVALUATE COMBAT FACTORS AND PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF BATTLES (1979)
[hereinafter NUMBERS] (exemplifying Dupuy’s commitment to integrating military
theory and history); T.N. DUPUY, UNDERSTANDING WAR: HISTORY AND THEORY OF COMBAT
(1987) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING] (same).
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philosophy of war from these materials was unusual and widely praised
inside the military. By the time of his death, he had published scores of
books and articles in military and professional journals across the
globe.37
Dupuy was born in New York, the son of Richard Ernest Dupuy, who
was himself a military historian and veteran. After graduating from the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1938, the younger Dupuy
fought in Burma during the war and by age twenty-seven had been
promoted to lieutenant colonel.38 He commanded artillery units across
several military theaters for the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Chinese military,39 and received honors for service and valor from
all three governments.40
Following the war, after a stint working for the military in Europe
and Washington, Dupuy began his academic career, first at Harvard and
then at the Ohio State University. His writing began in earnest while
teaching at Harvard. Seeing no text on military science that he could
use to teach his students, he approached the elder Dupuy to assist in
writing a textbook. What began as a mimeographed set of class
materials41 eventually turned into a two-volume publication, Military
Heritage of America, one of many projects father and son would
complete together.42
Dupuy focused on understanding the complexities of modern warfare
through the review of massive amounts of historical data.43 Roughly
contemporaneously, major military institutions began to invest heavily
in a discipline called “operations research” that sought to bring
quantitative tools to bear on military strategy. Analytical centers and
think tanks,44 like RAND (for “research and development”), as well as
other “civilian defense planners” became an “integral part” of United
37

Walker, supra note 35, at 33.
Thomas, supra note 35, at B11.
39 Rich, supra note 35.
40 Id.
41 Rich, supra note 35. On Dupuy’s contributions to military history, see LAWRENCE,
supra note 35, at ix-17.
42 Rich, supra note 35. See DUPUY, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 36, at X; see also
DUPUY, NUMBERS, supra note 36, at xv; LAWRENCE, supra note 35, at ix-xii.
43 LAWRENCE, supra note 35, at x. For more information about the research on
tactical weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, see, for example, James Fallows, M-16: A
Bureaucratic Horror Story Why the Rifles Jammed, ATLANTIC (June 1981),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1981/06/m-16-a-bureaucratic-horrorstory/545153 [https://perma.cc/QHN5-LE7E].
44 See CHARLES R. SHRADER, HISTORY OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN THE U.S. ARMY
VOLUME 1: 1942-1962, at iii (2006).
38
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States security planning at this time.45 However, “even after 3,300 years
of recorded military history” reliable data was hard to come by.46 This
lack of hard data led Dupuy to reach for new techniques on which to
base operational analysis and combat modeling. His research attempted
to link combat modelers who needed reliable data on combat operations
with the existing information present in the unit records of actual
historical engagements.47
Intense, professional, and tenacious, Dupuy believed that the study
of historical combat could and should be used to prepare for future
conflicts.48 In more than two dozen works, he analyzed the patterns of
warfare from ancient times to the present. He summarized his historical
approach in his book, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.49 While
Dupuy was a great believer in quantifying the dynamics of warfare, he
thought that the data should be drawn from the history of past wars.50
He was skeptical about the value of war-gaming and simulation
exercises divorced from what Carl von Clausewitz described as the “fog”
and “friction” of war.51
From 1960 to 1962, Dupuy worked for the Institute of Defense
Analysis, where he was frequently consulted for advice and expertise.
For the next thirty years, he published books and gave lectures to
military audiences about the role of technology in war. He documented
a historical cycle for weapons technology: stagnant for long periods,
followed by bursts of intense change. He understood that it could take
decades — even centuries — for new technologies to be incorporated
into the tactics and organizational structure of armies.52 His research
documented technological change (from the stirrup to the gun) — and
showed that the pace of that change accelerated exponentially with the
nineteenth-century industrial revolution and then again with the
intense state-led innovations of the two world wars.53
In part to study these technological and military dynamics, in 1962
Dupuy formed the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization
45

LAWRENCE, supra note 35, at ix.
Id.
47 LAWRENCE, supra note 35, at ix; DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at vii.
48 Rich, supra note 35; Walker, supra note 35, at 33.
49 DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at vii.
50 Id.
51 1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 39-40, 106 (J.J. Graham trans. 1873) On the
Pentagon’s reliance on wargaming, see JOHN PRADOS, PENTAGON GAMES: WARGAMING AND
THE AMERICAN MILITARY 4 (1987).
52 DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 300-05; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 35,
at 6-7.
53 DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 287-94.
46
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(HERO) and would serve as its President and Executive Director for the
next two decades. At HERO, he conducted many studies for the U.S.
Army, for which he accumulated detailed, recorded data from actual
battlefield experience. As he often remarked, military history was the
true “laboratory of the soldier.”54
In the process Dupuy developed an analytic procedure for comparing,
quantitatively, the lethality of individual weapons (the Theoretical
Lethality Index), described below.55 He also continued his work as an
author, lecturer, and military analyst until the end of his life. American
diplomats and military leaders consulted with him during the first Gulf
War, and he testified before Congress several times. He kept up a steady
media schedule, appearing on over thirty television and radio programs,
including spots on all of the major networks, C-Span, and CNN.56
Dupuy died at the age of seventy-nine on June 5, 1995, of a selfinflicted gunshot wound, three weeks after being diagnosed with
terminal pancreatic cancer.57 At the time of his death he was considered
“one of the world’s leading military historians.”58 He left behind several
unfinished projects, including his own autobiography, which he
planned to call “A Footnote to History.”59
The metrics on lethality that Dupuy pioneered are still being used in
policy papers and military history projects as well as in analysis of
modern military operations and combat.60 Dupuy’s work showed that
even military planners — whose profession is the study of weapons —
have repeatedly struggled to fully understand the impact of new,
improved weaponry on combat and society. Despite his prominence as
a military commander and military historian, little has been written
54 Shawn Woodford, “Human Factors in Warfare: Fear in a Lethal Environment,” THE
DUPUY INST.: MYSTICS & STATISTICS BLOG (Nov. 2, 2018), https://urldefense.com/v3/
__http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018/11/02/human-factors-in-warfare-fear-in-alethal-environment/__;!!OToaGQ!-mUY72ZfkYxHD9d0dFNBpg31R_LGM5aZ8X6i7U
0SGha2GUuyOLcaw_FlFfJmj7Hk2yg$ [https://perma.cc/Z7YJ-2K6L] (quoting Dupuy).
55 HIST. EVALUATION & RSCH. ORG., supra note 10.
56 Rich, supra note 35.
57 Walker, supra note 35, at 79.
58 Rich, supra note 35.
59 Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 35, at B11.
60 See, e.g., N.K. JAISWAL, MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH: QUANTITATIVE DECISION
MAKING 317-18 (1997); CARL MOSK, NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
MODERN EURASIA 91 (2013); James J. Schneider, The Theory of the Empty Battlefield, 132
J. ROYAL UNITED SERV. INST. 37, 37 (1987). The most recent validations of combat models
are described in Volume I, Nos 4, 5, and 6 and Volume III, Nos 1 and 2 of The Dupuy
Institute’s International Tactical, Numerical, Deterministic Model (“TNDM”)
Newsletter. International TNDM Newsletter, TDI: PUBLICATIONS (last visited Feb. 21,
2022) http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub4.htm [https://perma.cc/36PD-Z4NW].
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about him, leaving a gap in our historical understanding of this
important figure.
B. The Theoretical Lethality Index
A significant and underappreciated contribution of Dupuy is his
creation of a single metric, the Theoretical Lethality Index (“TLI”) that
provides apples-to-apples comparisons of the lethality of weaponry
across time. As he wrote in his Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, “All
weapons have at least one common characteristic: lethality — the ability
to injure and if possible to kill people.”61 The TLI reduced to a single
value how many persons a particular weapon could theoretically kill in
one hour, considering a spectrum of different technological factors,
including range, rate of fire, accuracy, reliability, mobility, “radius of
action” and vulnerability.62
Dupuy constructed the TLI by exhaustively examining the historical
record of real battles across time, where the lethal capacity of the
weapon was one among a host of other factors, including weather,
terrain, and the defensive and offensive capabilities of opposing forces.
His TLI represented an attempt to isolate, in one number, the lethality
of technology alone, based primarily on the characteristics of that
technology. Hence, the TLI number is not influenced by a military or
civilian context; it does not take into account factors like combat tactics,
how dispersed or bunched the targets may be or what defensive
positions they occupy. Nor does it account for the social or
psychological state of the individual using the weapon.63 The TLI is
solely about the lethality of the weapon as a technology designed to kill.
In contrast to those who analyzed warfare with abstract calculations
based on combat modelling and wargaming, Dupuy based his analysis
on scrupulous investigation of actual historical military engagements.
As he put it, “The history of warfare is a review of the manner in which
groups of men have . . . [used] their weapons more effectively than the
opponents, or in other words, by realizing, or at least approaching, the
ultimate degree of lethality of their weapons.”64 He explained: “Lethality

61

DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 286.
Id. at 92, 309-10.
63 To account for these other factors, along with the TLI, Dupuy calculated an
Operational Lethality Index (“OLI”). Id. at 309-10. A fruitful research question would
be to construct a civilian version of the OLI with respect to different weapons. But that
project is outside the scope of this paper.
64 Id. at 286.
62
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is necessarily a comparative thing.” 65 A sword wielded by a trained
combatant is lethal, “[b]ut its comparative lethality is limited by the
factors of time, range, and the physical limitations of the man who
wields it.” 66 Dupuy recognized that “[b]y assigning values to these
factors it is feasible to compare the lethality of the sword with the
lethality of the hydrogen bomb, or the tank, or whatever other weapon
one pleases.”67
Dupuy divided world history into three primary eras of weapons
technology. The “Age of Muscle” (c. 350 BC to 13th century) was the
era of the short sword and longbow. The “Age of Gunpowder” (14th
century to middle of the 19th century) introduced the bayonet, the
flintlock and the first cannons. But it was the “Age of Technological
Change” (middle of 19th century to middle of 20th century), he
thought, that ushered in major advances in weaponry. “The weapons of
this period constitute a quantum jump in lethality over their
predecessors of the age of gunpowder.”68 This era saw the development
of the conoidal rifle bullet (Minie ball) (1841); the breech-loading rifle
(c. 1848); the Maxim machine gun (1883); the bolt-operated magazine
rifle (1895); the tank (1916); the fighter-bomber (1917); the ballistic
missile (1944); and the atomic bomb (1945).69 Dupuy identified one of
the most profound changes in combat occurred between 1850 and
1860, when firearms became both more common and more deadly.70
Under contract with the U.S. Army, Dupuy and HERO analyzed the
relationship between weapons and military doctrine from the fourth
century BC to the end of the Korean War.71 The four-volume report that
he and his team produced included the TLI as a unitary metric for
lethality.
The report demonstrated that the TLI of weapons increased
exponentially in the past 200 years. While an eighteenth century soldier
with a flintlock musket could kill 43 people an hour, a soldier in the
Civil War era using the Minie ball could kill 102 people per hour: a
65

Id. at 286.
Id. at 286.
67 Id. at 286.
68 Id. at 292.
69 See id. at 292-94. In the age of technological change, there were many other
ancillary developments, including: the percussion cap, electronic communication,
barbed wire (first adapted to military purposes in 1874), smokeless powder (1885),
recoil mechanism, quick-firing artillery (1890-1910); radar (1938), and earth satellites
in space. See id. at 296-98.
70 DUPUY, NUMBERS supra note 36, at 6.
71 The process of introduction and assimilation of these new weapons is described
in a report that he produced, consisting of four volumes (342 pages).
66
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more than twofold increase.72 Breech-loading rifles, metal cartridges,
and magazines boosted the TLI of infantry rifles even higher, to 495 by
the end of the nineteenth century: a ten-fold increase over the flintlock
musket. The introduction of automatic fire machine guns at the end of
the nineteenth century again vastly increased the kill rate. The TLI of a
World War I machine gun was 3,463, and that of World War II, 4,973.73
Dupuy’s Theoretical Lethality Index74
Weapon
Sword, pike, etc.
Longbow
17th c. musket
18th c. flintlock
Early 19th c. rifle
Mid-19th c. rifle/conoidal bullet
Late 19th c. breech-loading rifle
Springfield Model 1903 rifle (magazine)
World War I machine gun
World War II machine gun
16th century 12-pdr cannon
17th century 12-pdr cannon
Gribeauval 18th century 12-pdr cannon
World War I tank
World War II medium tank
One-megaton nuclear airburst

TLI
23
36
19
43
36
102
153
495
3,463
4,973
43
224
940
6,926
575,000
695,385,000

Dupuy was convinced that there was a “relatively small” number of
major advances in weapons throughout history. He defined a “major
advance” as a “new development that changes the nature of warfare.”75
A major advance was “a revolutionary” change, which might be
followed by “a series of evolutionary changes.”76 One such
72

See DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 92.
Situating the modern AR-15 (a successor to the German StG 44, the first “assault
rifle,” that was used in World War 2) anywhere near the Maxim machine gun makes it
exponentially more lethal than the flintlock musket of the Founder’s era. The term “AR15” is now most-commonly used to refer only to the civilian variants of the rifle which
lack the fully automatic function. There are a variety of ways to convert an AR-15 to a
fully automatic weapon, as explained by Mike Searson, Turning Your AR-15 into an M16, RECOIL (June 5, 2019), https://www.recoilweb.com/turning-your-ar-15-into-an-m16-150631.html [https://perma.cc/XGT9-4WBZ].
74 This table is constructed from Dupuy’s data. DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 92.
75 Id. at 287.
76 Id.
73
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“revolutionary weapon” was the Maxim recoil-operated, belt-fed
machine gun which later became the model for other machine guns.77
He constructed the TLI using a standard formula. As he pointed out,
“Obviously the weapons that kill more people in shorter periods of time
have greater lethality.” The TLI showed that “there have been few major
advances in weapons lethality through the ages, and most of them have
occurred since about 1850.”78
III. LETHALITY AS A COMMON METRIC FOR ARMS
Currently, the analysis to determine whether any given “arm” is
constitutionally protected fails to display much analytical rigor. The
very features of large-capacity magazines that one judge thinks are
essential for self-defense79 are the very same features other judges
consider unreasonably dangerous.80 Trying to avoid the impasse by
searching for “lineal descendants” of muskets in the Sig Sauer catalog,
or by comparing the sales of rifles to pickup trucks81 threaten to make
Second Amendment analysis even more unmoored from anything
rational or functional.
At the very least, the TLI offers proof of concept that one can
construct a single metric for lethality that may provide a basis for
systematic comparisons of arms within and between time periods.82
Moreover, to the extent any question about gun rights and regulation
turns partially or wholly on historical analogs,83 the TLI supplies vital
historical context using a common denominator.
First, the TLI shows that weapons have increased sharply in lethality
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. Speaking of the
period between the 1850s and 1860s, Dupuy described weapon
advancement over prior ages during this time as a “quantum jump in

77

Id. at 287-90.
Id. at 287.
79 See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 162 (4th Cir. 2017) (Traxler, J., dissenting)
(indicating that untrained civilians need more rounds because they are likely to miss
the target).
80 See id. at 127 (“[W]hen inadequately trained civilians fire weapons equipped with
large-capacity magazines, they tend to fire more rounds than necessary and thus
endanger more bystanders.”).
81 See id. at 153.
82 But see Wallace, supra note 2, at 16-17 (arguing that lethality as a stable metric is
difficult to determine).
83 Currently history and historical analogs are part of the conventional two-step
framework for Second Amendment adjudication. The question in Bruen is whether this
historical test is the only step of the analysis.
78
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lethality.”84 Another period of steady acceleration in lethality followed
in the early to mid-twentieth century. Using apples-to-apples
comparisons, based on this index, one can see that in 1903 it would
only take two people with five-round Springfield rifles to kill as many
as an eighteenth-century cannon.85 By World War II it would require a
battery of five eighteenth century cannon to be as lethal as a single
machine gun.86
Contrary to the implausible proposition that “[n]othing in the Second
Amendment makes lethality a factor” in Second Amendment analysis,87
it is apparent that the people’s representatives have considered lethality
a relevant factor in the costs versus benefits of weapon technology from
the beginning.88 To the extent judges follow Justice Scalia’s proposition
that “traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the [Second
Amendment] right,”89 the TLI can help courts ask the right questions.
It is fruitless to ask counter-factuals like: “How would the founding
generation have regulated widespread private ownership of AR-15s?”
That’s akin to basing a First Amendment decision about home console
entertainment on “what James Madison thought about video games.”90
It’s a more useful question to ask: “What is the lethality threshold of the
word ‘arms’ in the Second Amendment?” Using a single metric —
lethality — can also help translate regulatory justifications to new
technological environments as well as recognize the fact and pace of

84

DUPUY, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 292.
See id. at 92.
86 See id.
87 Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145-46 (S.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 970
F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th
Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc sub nom. Duncan v. Bonta, No. 19-55376, 2021 WL 5577267
at *119 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2021), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
88 See Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance to Prevent Accidents from the Firing of Cannon
or Other Guns on Boats, in Front of the City of Cincinnati (Mar. 9, 1825) (“[I]t shall
not be lawful for any person or persons having charge or being on board of any boat
upon the Ohio river, when passing by, stopping at, or leaving the city of Cincinnati, to
cause any cannon, gun or other fire-arms to be so fired as to discharge its contents
towards the city . . . .”); Phila., Pa., Gun-Cotton Act of Assembly (Mar. 16, 1847)
(“Whereas, an article called gun cotton, with properties of ignition and explosion
similar to those of gunpowder, and equally if not more dangerous in towns and cities,
has been introduced. Therefore . . . no gun-cotton shall be introduced in Philadelphia,
nor placed in storage therein, in greater bulk or quantity in any one place, than is
permitted by existing laws, with regard to gunpowder . . . .”).
89 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
90 The quote is a sardonic remark by Justice Samuel Alito during oral argument over
First Amendment protection of violent video games. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17,
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448).
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change in lethality between different eras.91 The TLI or similar tools can
also help give content to distinctions between weapons suitable for
personal self-defense and those “weapons of war” not covered by the
Second Amendment.92 By using lethality as a metric, rather than less
functional traits like the shape of a weapon, its materials, or its
popularity, researchers can make inferences across different times along
a margin that is of practical relevance.
The Founders lived in a period when they could perhaps be forgiven
for thinking that “a gun is a gun is a gun,” because the basic flintlock
hadn’t really become significantly more lethal in the previous 150 or so
years. If the Constitution had been written in the middle of the
nineteenth century, instead of the 1780s, the Founders would have been
much more aware of the pace of innovation.93 But we don’t have to
speculate about how lawmakers may have reacted to knowledge of
technological change. As Saul Cornell has noted, the nineteenth
century, especially during and after Reconstruction, witnessed a flurry
of regulation and constitution-drafting just as technological change was
making firearms more common, concealable, and deadly.
The massive battlefield casualties of the American Civil War vividly
revealed the lethality of new firearms technologies — especially the
Minie ball. Cornell has argued that “Reconstruction ushered in one of
the most intense periods of gun regulation in American history.”94 He
has documented how — in a significant act of constitution drafting
during Reconstruction — many states both guaranteed a right to arms
in their state constitutions, but were “equally committed to enacting
strong racially neutral gun regulations, aimed at reducing interpersonal
violence and preserving the peace.”95 For example, Georgia’s
Reconstruction constitution of 1877 stated: “[T]he right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly
shall have power to prescribe by law the manner in which arms may be

91 For more on this move of “translation,” see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1211 (1993) (“[T]he practice of translation moves in
two stages: first, understanding the contexts between which the translator must move;
and second, locating something called an equivalence between the two contexts.”).
92 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have no power to
extend Second Amendment protection to the weapons of war that the Heller decision
explicitly excluded from . . . coverage.”).
93 See Tucker, supra note 9.
94 Saul Cornell, Symposium, The Right to Regulate Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Emergence of Good Cause Permit Schemes in Post-Civil War America, 55
UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 65, 67 (2021).
95 Id.
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borne.”96 The 1869 Constitution of Texas stated “Every person shall
have the right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or
the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.”97
Indeed, a brief examination of many of these Reconstruction and Gilded
Age constitutions show both a statement about the right to keep and
bear arms and a right to reasonably regulate such a practice. The TLI
shows that these lawmakers were not operating in a technological
vacuum; they were securing an express ability to regulate weapons at
precisely the time that firearms were becoming dramatically more
lethal.98
Finally, whether you adhere to a theory that the Second Amendment
is for self-defense against common criminals or against rogue
governments, the TLI provides a tool to assess the weapon technology
along a single dimension. For example, if one believes that right metric
for self-defense weaponry is that kind of defensive armament most
effective at countering a typical criminal threat, the TLI offers a number.
How many people per hour is it necessary to kill in order to supply an
adequate deterrent to common criminal perpetrators? Alternatively,
although we are highly skeptical that the anti-tyranny purpose the
Second Amendment contains much legally enforceable content, if one
truly believes that weapons must be in the hands of private parties to
counter the capacity of the United States military,99 this metric provides
some common denominator for that argument as well.100

96

GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 1, pt. XXII (emphasis added).
TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
98 For more on this point, see Darrell Miller, New Research from the UC Davis Symposium:
The Theoretical Lethality Index, Reconstruction Regulation and Enforcement, DUKE CTR. FOR
FIREARMS L.: SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (Oct. 22, 2021), https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/
2021/10/new-research-from-the-uc-davis-symposium-the-theoretical-lethality-indexreconstruction-regulation-and-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/G7BC-QUNR].
99 James B. Astrachan, The Bumpy Road to the Supreme Court: Does the Second
Amendment Prevent States from Prohibiting Ownership of Assault-Style Rifles and HighCapacity Magazines?, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 337, 375 (2018) (“[I]t is not the role of the
courts to take away from the citizens the means to most effectively oppose such a
[tyrannical] government.”).
100 See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT
169 (2018) (“The keeping and bearing of lethal arms to deter government officials may
be connected to the Second Amendment, but it is likely that the value is primarily moral
or political, rather than a judicially administrable constitutional entitlement.”). But to
the extent such an argument requires something other than speculation, the TLI offers
some metric from which to assess what kind of weaponry in private hands would be
necessary to counter a military armed with machine guns, artillery, and nuclear
weapons. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Second Amendment Equilibria, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 239,
256-57 (2021).
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Granted, the TLI cannot provide answers to all interpretive challenges
of the Second Amendment. The TLI itself does not provide metrics for
a host of twenty-first century weapons. (Military experts must
extrapolate from Dupuy’s methods to say what the theoretical lethality
index of a modern 9mm pistol would be, for example). Non-experts, or
those without access to the proprietary methods of the Dupuy Institute,
can only provide estimates about where modern technology fit (a
modern AR-15 is almost certainly more lethal than an eighteenth
century musket and less lethal than a World War II medium tank, for
instance). However, even with these limitations the TLI does provides
a reliable benchmark from which to generate judgments about
comparative lethality. The TLI, and derivative indices, offer a useful
metric for understanding the lethality of different weapons, across time,
and can therefore make an important contribution to the debate over
the right to keep and bear arms.
CONCLUSION
After a decade of slumber, it is clear the Supreme Court, with its new
conservative super-majority, is now awakening to decide Second
Amendment matters left undecided after Heller. In the next few years,
the Court is almost certain to address what counts as a constitutionally
protected “arm.” In doing so, it is also likely to rely on history and
tradition to a greater degree than most other rights. Lethality, and the
Theoretical Lethality Index constructed by Dupuy and his team, offers
one way for the justices to anchor their analysis to historically-driven
metrics that are functional, intelligible, and relevant; rather than those
that are rhetorical and trivial.

